The Court accepted that the question of whether a party is required to act through a next friend should ordinarily be determined by the party himself or by those caring for him (perhaps with the advice of a solicitor), without the need for inquiry by the Court.

Mr Harjang Singh was the subject of a deportation order issued in 2003 as a result of several serious criminal convictions. Following a 2017 conviction for blackmail, Mr Singh was detained at Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre pending deportation section 32(3) of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115).

The Registrar held that the overall impression created by the applied-for marks shared a “very low” degree of similarity with the Opponent’s earlier marks, and use of the applied-for marks would not likely cause confusion on the part of the public or average consumer.

The learned Master agreed with the Defendant’s submission that the alleged agreement’s terms are unenforceable for uncertainty. In particular, the consideration, scope of services to be rendered by the Plaintiff and the late father’s payment obligation all lacked certainty or clarity.

The plaintiff claims against the defendants for libel, malicious falsehood, and breach of confidence related to the publication of two emails. The relevant emails contained allegations of sporting misconduct on the Plaintiff’s part that allegedly took place during a ladies’ lawn bowls game.

The Master struck out these claims on the grounds that the Plaintiff had no locus to sue on behalf of the estate and/or in her capacity as beneficiary, and that her pleadings in support of the action on the alleged agreement with the 1st Defendant is defective.

The Court of Final Appeal confirmed that the “leverage” created by the prospect of a winding-up — as opposed to the making of a winding-up order — is a legitimate form of “benefit” under this requirement.

The learned Magistrate accepted the defence’s submission of no case to answer and found that the Prosecution’s evidence, even taken at its highest, was not sufficient to prove that the defendant had driven dangerously.

The court accepted and emphasized that interpreting the phrase “injury by accident” as a compound expression to mean “accidental injury” would be too wide for the present purpose. Instead, “accident” is held to be distinct from “injury” and is the causative event of “injury”.

The Court took into account the significant amount of the Loan and the interest rate, the fact that the interest generated from the Loan accounted for more than 98% of its annual revenue in 2018 and 2019, and that the petitioner was acting jointly with a licensed money lender in the transaction.