Competing for Talent: How Labour Markets Became the New Antitrust Frontier, UK–EU–Hong Kong perspectives for employers, HR leaders and counsel
Key takeaways
• No‑poach and wage‑fixing are now treated as hardcore cartels. The European Commission (EC) and the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) consider these practices “by object” infringements; Hong Kong’s Competition Commission (HKCC) has warned of the same risks since 2018. Employers are buyers of labour and labour‑market collusion is a buyer‑side cartel. Sources: EC Policy Brief (May 2024) | CMA Guide (PDF) | HKCC Advisory (PDF)
• Landmark EU decision. On 2 June 2025, the EC issued its first labour‑market cartel decision, fining Delivery Hero and Glovo €329 million for no‑poach, sensitive information exchange, and market allocation—with collusion facilitated by a minority shareholding. Sources: EC Press Release (IP_25_1356)
• UK escalation. The CMA issued its first labour‑market infringement decision in April 2025 (sports broadcasting freelancers—wage‑related information sharing; fines of ~£4.24m), followed by the “Competing for Talent” guidance aimed squarely at HR. Sources: CMA Guide (PDF)
Introduction: From overcharge to underpay
For decades, antitrust agencies were preoccupied with overcharge—cartels that inflated prices to consumers. Today, the lens has widened to underpay—cartels that depress wages and stifle worker mobility. The European Commission’s 2024 Policy Brief placed labour markets squarely within Article 101 TFEU; the UK CMA’s new Competing for Talent guide translates the same principles for HR professionals; and Hong Kong’s regulator anticipated many of these concerns in its 2018 Advisory Bulletin. The result is convergence: no‑poach, wage‑fixing, and sensitive pay information exchange are antitrust red lines.
The legal theory: labour markets as input‑procurement cartels
No‑poach agreements divide sources of labour supply; wage‑fixing sets the purchase price of labour. Both mirror classic cartels in product markets and are typically treated as by‑object infringements—unlawful without proving anticompetitive effects. Crucially, the definition of competitor expands: two firms may be rivals for talent even if they do not compete for customers (e.g., a manufacturer and a software firm recruiting the same engineers).
The EU’s first labour‑market cartel decision: Delivery Hero/Glovo
On 2 June 2025, the Commission announced fines totalling €329 million against Delivery Hero and Glovo. The conduct, lasting 2018–2022, involved (i) reciprocal no‑poach understandings rooted in a shareholder agreement, (ii) extensive exchange of competitively sensitive information (pricing, costs, strategies), and (iii) allocation of national markets—a multi‑layered coordination. Notably, the Commission highlighted how Delivery Hero’s minority stake in Glovo facilitated access to confidential information and alignment of strategies.
The UK’s position: enforcement plus practical guidance
In April 2025, the CMA issued its first labour‑market decision, fining five broadcasters and production businesses over bilateral exchanges of freelancer pay rates in sports content production—treated as by‑object infringements. In September 2025, the CMA published Competing for Talent, a plain‑English guide for HR, recruiters and in‑house counsel, debunking the myth that antitrust does not apply to hiring.
Hong Kong: early and clear warnings
Since 2018, the HKCC has cautioned that wage‑fixing (including benefits, allowances, severance) and no‑poach agreements between employers may breach the First Conduct Rule, even where the firms are not product‑market rivals. The HKCC frames the labour market as an input‑procurement market; employers are purchasers competing for labour. The Advisory offers pragmatic guidance on benchmarking (historic, aggregated, third‑party administered) and reminds businesses of leniency and penalties of up to 10% of Hong Kong turnover.
Grey areas: ancillary restraints, collective bargaining and benchmarking
Not all restraints are equal. Three recurring borderlines deserve careful drafting: (1) Ancillary non‑solicit provisions in M&A, outsourcing and secondment may be defensible if objectively necessary, proportionate and tightly limited in duration, scope and roles; (2) Collective bargaining with workers generally sitting outside competition law, but risks arise if employers use it to coordinate wage norms; (3) Benchmarking is safer if data are historic, aggregated, anonymised and run by an independent third party—never exchange current or forward‑looking pay plans bilaterally.
Sanctions, leniency and process risks
EU/UK: Fines of up to 10% of worldwide turnover, potential settlement discounts, and—in the UK—director disqualification in cartel contexts. The EC’s 2025 case underscores the role of anonymous whistleblowers and cooperation with national authorities.
Hong Kong: Penalties up to 10% of Hong Kong turnover per year of infringement; leniency is available to the first to self‑report and cooperate; recent cases show disqualification orders are in play.
A practical compliance playbook for employers and HR
1) Prohibit naked arrangements (no‑poach/no‑hire/no‑cold‑call; wage‑fixing). 2) Redefine competitor (anyone recruiting the same skillsets). 3) Information‑sharing guardrails (no current/future pay exchanges; use independent, historic, aggregated surveys). 4) Contract‑clause triage for non‑solicits (necessary, narrow, time‑limited, role‑specific). 5) Minority shareholding hygiene (clean teams, firewalls, need‑to‑know). 6) Dawn‑raid & whistleblower readiness. 7) Global policy with local annexes. 8) If in doubt: stop, preserve, seek advice, consider leniency/settlement.
Outlook: what to watch in 2025–2026
Follow‑on EU and Member State actions (e.g., France and Portugal fines) are likely; expect more scrutiny of trade‑body pay surveys and association roundtables; watch the evolving boundary for gig‑economy collective bargaining; and anticipate closer M&A/acqui‑hire scrutiny on HR data and ancillary restraints.
Conclusion
The war for talent has an antitrust dimension. The EU’s first labour‑market cartel decision, the CMA’s targeted guidance and early UK fines, and Hong Kong’s long‑standing warnings now point in the same direction: competition law applies with full force to hiring and pay. For multinational employers, compliance can no longer be siloed in sales and procurement; HR and Talent Acquisition are frontline risk areas. With clear policies, careful drafting of legitimate restraints, and robust information‑sharing controls, businesses can compete vigorously for talent—without competing against the law.
Further reading and context
• CMA, Competing for Talent (9 Sept 2025) – What businesses need to know when recruiting workers and setting pay. (link)
• EC Policy Brief: Antitrust in Labour Markets (May 2024). (link)
• HKCC Advisory Bulletin (2018): Employment practices—wage‑fixing, no‑poach, information exchange. (link)
• EC Press Release (2 June 2025): Delivery Hero/Glovo fines (€329m). (link)
Author: Carter Chim
Carter Chim
“Carter is a leading specialist in competition law in Hong Kong and is known for his deep legal knowledge in EU and Hong Kong competition law. He is a very collaborative and effective communicator, he gives pragmatic advice that addresses commercial realities and client sensitivities, and his persuasive style and ability to distill complex legal concepts into accessible language make him a compelling advocate.”
Legal 500 Asia-Pacific 2025, Competition — Leading Juniors
Carter has been recognised by The Legal 500 (Legalease) as a Leading Junior (Tier 1) in Competition Law for five consecutive years (i.e. 2021 to 2025).
Carter has acted in a number of landmark constitutional and administrative law cases before the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, including Secretary for Justice v Leung Kwok Hung [2021] HKCFA 32 (concerning the scope of parliamentary privilege enjoyed by a member of the Legislative Council in the course of proceedings).
General civil matters form a core part of Carter’s practice. Matters which he is regularly instructed to handle include winding up petitions (for the successful petitioner in Re Yuan Tong Global Financial Group Ltd [2021] HKCFI 1534), water leakage cases, property disputes, discrimination cases, and more.
View Carter’s profile for more information.
This article was first published on 2 October 2025.
Disclaimer: This article does not constitute legal advice and seeks to set out the general principles of the law. Detailed advice should therefore be sought from a legal professional relating to the individual merits and facts of a particular case. The photographs which appear in this article are included for decorative purposes only and should not be taken as a depiction of any matter to which the case is related. The views and opinions expressed in this article/material are solely those of the members authoring it and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Denis Chang’s Chambers, or of any other member or members of Denis Chang’s Chambers.